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it was trying to achieve was too far in advance of what would
legitimately be expected of the international community at that
time: it was premature. It was then reintroduced in 1991, in the
form of a draft tabled by Costa Rica to the then UN Commission
on Human Rights, and the process of discussion and negotiation was not finally brought to a conclusion until 2002. So, it’s
fair to say that it has taken about 25 years to bring the Optional
Protocol into being.
What does this tell us? First, and perhaps most importantly, it
gives the lie to the impression which one could perhaps be forgiven for having received in light of the many points that have
already been made during this conference, that it is obvious that
the monitoring of places of detention plays a very important part
in the process of addressing torture and inhuman or degrading
treatment and punishment. The history of the evolution of this
instrument suggests that this is an argument that has been long
fought-over before it has finally been won, if indeed it has been
won (and this is an important qualification).

hank you very much indeed for this opportunity to
speak to you this afternoon.

One of the difficulties
of having listened to so many presentations during the
course of the day is that the rather rough notes that I intended
to speak from have evolved into more of a work of art than a
set of speaker’s notes, as they attempt to reflect and respond to
the points made. Nevertheless, what I’m going to do in the time
available is to attempt to address the question which is posed on
the sheet: ‘Expectations of the Subcommittee on the Prevention
of Torture, the National Preventative Mechanisms and the UN
Optional Protocol to the Torture Convention.’ Although this
really does require more than five minutes per topic, I shall see
what can be done.
As with any academic giving a presentation who is a little
unsure of quite what to do, the first thing is to deconstruct the
question. The moment I saw this title, the immediate question
that came to my mind was: whose expectations are we talking
about here? Are we talking about the expectations of the states
parties or are we concerned with the expectations of the various
bodies themselves? There are a whole host of other angles and
questions that could legitimately be factored in besides these,
but you would be pleased to know I’m not going to do so.
As Manfred Nowak said at the start this morning, the
Optional Protocol to the Torture Convention is seen as one of
the most important new developments relating to torture and
torture prevention for many years. I want to reflect on that just
for a few moments. Although it is a ‘new development’ in that
the Protocol only entered into force in 2006, it’s not that new an
idea. The idea underlying the Optional Protocol owes its origins
to thinking which emerged at more or less the same time as the
thinking which led to the conclusion of the Convention against
Torture itself back in the mid to late 1970s. To that extent, the
ideas were contemporaries, but they had very different trajectories. The Convention against Torture itself was taken forward
in now what looks like a very rapid process, with negotiations
beginning in the late 70s and being concluded by 1984. The
idea of this Optional Protocol, which I will outline in just a few
moments, was also originally conceived in the late 1970s, and
was tabled alongside the negotiations for the Convention itself.
However, it was immediately set aside on the grounds that what

What does the Optional Protocol require of
States parties?
On one level its requirements seem remarkably, even breathtakingly, simple. The underlying idea is that the prevention of
torture, inhuman, and degrading treatment can be facilitated by
visits of a preventive nature to all places of detention. Whilst
this sounds disarmingly simple, it is of course no such thing.
As has already been made clear by others, if there is too much
advanced notice of such visits, then preparations can be made,
with all that that implies. In consequence, the idea evolves
slightly into unannounced visits to places of the detention with
absolute rights of access to be conducted at short or no notice.
But this inevitably must be subject to a variety of constraints for
legitimate operational reasons, and the moment one starts writing in these inevitable riders and qualifications into instruments
developed in the international domain, one immediately runs
into some fairly powerful problems.
The overall title of this Panel is “transparency” – and one of
the paradoxes of the international monitoring system created by
the Optional Protocol (and indeed in the European Convention
for the Prevention of Torture, which was an early product of
this line of thinking) is that the price to be paid for access to
places of detention by international mechanisms of this nature
– is that there has to be, in some senses, a lack of transparency.
Confidentiality is the quid pro quo that states have demanded for
the creation of these international mechanisms permitting inter-
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national experts to visit and have access to places of detention,
and that veil of confidentiality may only be lifted by the express
consent of the state itself. In many ways, this is considered less
transparent than much of what else happens within the human
rights world and indeed considerably less transparent than what
already takes place at the domestic level in many states, where
the reports or outcomes of domestic monitoring mechanisms are
publicly available. This says something about the sensitive, if
not controversial, nature of such mechanisms at the international
level.
I ought to say, if I may, that much has been said today of
the United States’ experience in the international domain, and
it must be said that the United States was not one of the most
whole-hearted supporters of the Optional Protocol. Indeed,
when the Convention was put to the UN General Assembly for
adoption, it was one of the four states which voted against, being
supported by the Marshall Islands, Palau and Nigeria. When the
draft text had been considered by the UN Third Committee, the
United States had also voted against, along with Syria, Cuba,
China, Vietnam, Nigeria, Japan and Israel. It is fair to say
that the U.S. has long been, at best, ambivalent with regard to
this project. Once again, this underlies the need to continually
rearticulate the case for preventive visits to places of detention
as an element of the preventive framework of torture.

persons may be detained of their liberty by a public authority.
This might require the creation of an entirely new body working
at the domestic level or it might be satisfied by the designation
of existing bodies where they already exist within the system.
Whilst the Protocol provides a degree of detail surrounding
these national preventive mechanisms, there is considerable
scope for national interpretation – and hence debate – about
what they required in practice.
The twin-track system created by the Convention is certainly
innovative and is proving to be extraordinarily challenging, as
is shown by the practice to date. It is challenging because the
international committee, the Subcommittee for the Prevention
of Torture, does not have the practical capacity to fulfill the
full reach of its mandate. In its first annual report published
last year, the Subcommittee says that it would aspire to visit all
countries a party to the instrument on a cycle of around four or
five years. Given that there are now 44 states, and it seems able
on the resources available to it to be able to visit no more than
three or four a year, it is clear this aspiration is unlikely to be
realized. Before one gets too despondent about this, it has to be
said that exactly the same is true in the European Theater, where
the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, which is
far better resourced, has proven itself unable to match its own
aspirations in terms of regularity of visiting. So, one might say
that one thing states ought not to expect from the international
committee, to avert to the title of this talk, is very frequent visit
from the international body itself. For most of those working
within places of detention, or within their administrative apparatus, a visit from the SPT might literally be a once in a lifetime
experience.
What might be expected as a consequence of the Optional
Protocol, however, is a much more developed system of
inspection of places of detention from the national preventive
mechanisms operating within the Convention framework. The
difficulty here is working out precisely what is meant by a
national preventive mechanism. This ties in with one of the most
fundamental questions that the creation of the Protocol has generated: What is meant by ‘preventive visits’? What is meant by
the overall and overarching idea of the concept of prevention? In
terms of looking at the types of bodies that deal with or address
concerns within detention facilities in many countries, there is a
seemingly straightforward differentiation between those mechanisms which are seen as being reactive (such as ombudsmen’s
offices, complaints commissions, etc., who, when there are
known to be difficulties, will move in to address the problem)
and those which are seen as more proactive bodies and who
visit on the basis of a more general inspectoral mandate, and
which, on a regular, routine basis, go into facilities to observe
the conditions of detention, to observe the way in which people
are treated, and to make recommendations as to how matters
might be improved. This ‘bright line’ division between reactive
and proactive certainly is one of the hallmarks of a body which
is properly configured as a national preventive mechanism relating to torture and ill-treatment as opposed to a body which is, in
essence, a complaints mechanism (important though these are).
One needs to understand more about what is meant by the concept of prevention to understand more fully both what the practi-

What does the Optional Protocol require?
The most innovative element of the Protocol was in some
regard the product of the negotiating difficulties which surrounded it. As originally conceived and drafted, it was designed
to create a single international visiting mechanism, much like
that which exists in Europe, the European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture. However, the opposition to a purely
international mechanism was such that a compromise proposal
was put forward: that the Protocol should have within it a dual
system, comprising an international preventive mechanism
whilst also permitting states to construct their own domestic
national preventive mechanisms, which would exercise exactly
the same type of powers of visit as the protocol provided for the
international mechanism.
The idea of there being a choice between the international
on the one hand, and the national on the other, was clearly
unacceptable to many of those behind the idea of international
monitoring as a preventive tool. So, over time, these two elements became drawn ever more closely together, resulting in the
composite dual system that now exists. The Protocol provides
for the creation of an international body, the Subcommittee
on Prevention of Torture (SPT) which currently comprises ten
members, but is likely soon to rise to 25 members when the
number of states parties to the instrument rises from its current
number of 44 to 50. The SPT has the mandate to visit any state
party in order to visit places of detention as they wish, with
unimpeded access; the quid pro quo being that their reports
and commentaries are transmitted to the state in confidence
and only are released with permission from the state. Alongside
this, however, lies an obligation for states parties to create or
designate a national preventive mechanism, or mechanisms,
which have exactly the same powers of access to place where
49
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human rights commissions which is likely to be ill-suited to
achieve the outcomes of either instrument. There is, then, very
important work to be done with regard to refining our understanding of what it required.
Finally, there is some very recent practice from the UK,
which I should like to draw to your attention. Last week, the
House of Lords gave a very important decision concerning the
British policy of ‘Deportation with Assurances’. Deportation
with Assurances is the current British response to the problem
of what to do about a situation in which foreign nationals within
the jurisdiction who one wishes to deport as they are believed
to be a threat to national security but who cannot be deported
due to the risk of their being subjected to forms of torture, inhuman, degrading treatment or other human rights violations. In
a very interesting, and I think very important judgment given
by the House of Lords last week ((RB (Algeria) and others v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] UKHL 10
(18 February 2009)) it was decided that is was permissible to
return a person to Jordan, despite there being a real risk that
the person would be subjected to judicial proceedings in which
evidence that had been the product of torture would be used
against him. One of the Judges – Lord Hoffman – said the following: “As to external monitoring, a good deal has been written
about its importance in enabling a court or other authority to be
satisfied that the receiving state is complying with assurances
about safety upon return. There is no doubt that in the absence
of some provision for external monitoring, such assurances may
be no more than empty words. But, there is no rule of law that
external monitoring is required.” The House of Lords stressed
that what was necessary was some form of verification; and
external monitoring, monitoring places of detention – visiting
mechanisms – are only one possible form of verification that can
be set aside if others sufficient means of verification are in place.
In this instance, the Court felt that the provisions which were in
place were adequate for this purpose, even though they did not
include visiting mechanisms along the lines of those provided
for in the OPACT.
I think this, once again, underlines why it is important to continue to articulate the importance of monitoring places of detention as part of the broader overarching idea of torture prevention
and underscores the need to devise a more general preventive
approach which embraces visits as a monitoring mechanism
within a coherent overall holistic approach, rather than its being
seem as a discrete subset of activity.
I wish time would allow me to say more on this topic – but
I am sure you don’t, and it is your wish which is going to be
acceded to! Thank you for the attention.
HRB

cal work of the SPT should be, and also to understand what is
to be expected of the national preventive mechanisms, in terms
of designation and operation. On this point, it is possible to step
back a little in order to isolate and identify a few more general
trends which inform this. I also think that these trends concerning the development of an overarching concept of prevention are
significant not only for the international visiting mechanisms or
the national visiting mechanisms, but also for the work of the
Committee Against Torture itself, the Special Rapporteur, and
many of the other international bodies
The broader issues, very briefly, are these. First of all, if one
looks at the judgment of the International Court of Justice in
the Bosnian Genocide case a little while ago, a very interesting
observation can be made about the grounds on which Serbia
Montenegro was held liable. It was not because it was directly
responsible for the actions of those who had committed genocide or genocidal acts in Srebrenica, but, the court tells us, for
its failure to have done all it could have done to prevent those
violations from taking place. In other words, in relation to the
Genocide Convention (which as far as I can see in relevant terms
is couched exactly the same as the Torture Convention and the
torture prohibition), we find in general international law the
beginnings of the emergence of a more general preventive concept. I think this is really rather important, and more needs to be
done, to tease out the implications of this. (There are of course
resonances with the more general concept of the ‘responsibility
to protect’, but that lies beyond the scope of these observations). Secondly, the idea of national preventive mechanisms
as a means of addressing human rights concerns is becoming
more broadly applied. The UN Disability Rights Convention,
for example, now has the equivalent of national preventive
mechanisms written into that, and some countries, including my
own, are now beginning to reflect on how they respond to that
challenge. This, and any further such developments, may have
a significant impact on our understanding of what national preventive mechanisms are and how they should function.
One of the issues that has arisen in some countries which
have already designated national human rights commissions as
national preventive mechanisms under the OPCAT is whether
they should use the same bodies to fulfill the national preventive
mechanism requirements of the Disability Rights Convention
(and any others which come along). The answer to this is likely
to depend upon what one means by prevention and how this
plays out in the context of two very different sets of obligations.
States, in the interests of efficiency and economy, may well
seek to draw those strands together in something that will end
up looking like a single overarching remit tacked on to national
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